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ESSAY
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM: THEIR
IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE
FUNCTIONING OF OUR GOVERNMENT*
During the 200-year history of the American Constitution, the
United States has evolved from thirteen disunited states into the
most powerful and productive country in the world. Under the
framework of government designed in 1787, the United States has
not merely survived but prevailed despite a revolutionary birth, a
civil war, two world wars, a great depression, and more than one
constitutional crisis. All the while, the United States has main-
tained a democratic republic in which the rights of the people have
been not only preserved but increased.
Fundamental components of the successful governmental frame-
work formulated by the Founders are the twin pillars of American
constitutionalism: separation of powers1 and federalism. It must be
emphasized, however, that these are not perfect doctrines. They
have been a source of folly and frustration and have created
problems for officials at all levels and in every branch of govern-
ment. They have rendered the American government less than effi-
cient and at times have permitted abuse of individual liberties.
Opposition to the separation of powers has a long and distin-
guished history. For two centuries, critics have pointed out that
the system results in stalemate and confrontation, denies account-
ability, and inhibits the government in formulating and sustaining
* This essay won the Fourth Circuit and the national prizes in the Law School Essay
Competition cosponsored by the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution and West Publishing Company. The topic of the competition was: "Does the
allocation of power between the federal and state governments and among the branches of
the federal government contribute to the preservation of individual liberty and the
functioning of our government?" The winning essay, originally restricted to 5000 words, is
reprinted here with minor clarifications that may cause it to exceed its original length.
1. Although separation of powers and checks and balances are not necessarily the same
doctrine, for the sake of brevity, they are treated somewhat synonymously in this essay.
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coherent policy. Skeptics of separated powers included early Amer-
ican giants such as Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, and
Thomas Paine.2
At the turn of the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson ques-
tioned the system. He charged that separated powers had led to
congressional supremacy, and the distribution of congressional
power among committees had resulted in government by commit-
tee.3 Wilson also challenged the basic premise of the doctrine be-
cause it pitted the branches of government against each other. "No
living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks,
and live," he wrote.4
Wilson was typical of many political observers of his time. In
1920, a commentator noted that his contemporaries "dispute the
value and even the reality of the theoretical division of governmen-
tal functions upon which it rests .... [I]t has become 'an unwork-
able and unapplicable rule of law.' ,,5 Recently, Lloyd Cutler has
called for a restructuring of the American political system along
the lines of the British parliamentary system. He charges that be-
cause the system of separated powers fractionalizes power, it con-
stitutes a structural weakness in government.0
Federalism, too, has been a source of confusion and problems.
Because federalism reserves to the states the powers not granted to
the federal government, there has always been the question of who
has what power. For nearly four score and seven years after the
founding of the nation, this problem produced one crisis after an-
other, as witnessed by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the
Hartford Convention,8 and the Nullification Crisis.9 The Civil War
2. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L.
REv. 385, 394-96 (1935).
3. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONA GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1913). See J. ROHE, To RUN A CONSTI-
TuriON 60-65 (1986).
4. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES 6 (1900).
5. Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, 29 YALE L.J.
369, 369-70 (1920).
6. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980).
7. In 1789 and 1799, the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky passed resolutions declar-
ing that states had the right to void acts (Alien and Sedition Acts) of the federal
government.
8. In 1814 and 1815, representatives from several New England states met in Hartford,
Connecticut. They issued a report urging states to resist unconstitutional acts of Congress,
called for states' rights, and discussed the right of secession from the Union.
9. In 1832, a South Carolina state convention passed the Ordinance of Nullification that
declared null and void acts of the federal government (the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832). The
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determined that the national government was supreme, but the
precise boundaries of state and national powers remained in dis-
pute. For the next hundred years, the supremacy of the national
government, particularly in the area of civil rights, was guaranteed
only by federal troops.10
The Supreme Court's decisions in National League of Cities v.
Usery" and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 2 which dealt with the question of whether state sovereignty
restricts Congress in exercising its power under the commerce
clause, reveal the current difficulties in determining which govern-
ment has what power. The decision in Garcia reveals the distance
the American government has traveled since the day Alexander
Hamilton wrote: "It will always be far more easy for the State gov-
ernments to encroach upon the national authorities, than for the
National government to encroach upon the State authorities.' 3 In
fact, Garcia provoked one scholar to write of the "demise of a mis-
guided doctrine"' 4 and another to pronounce the "second death of
federalism.' ' 5
Despite the problems of both separation of powers and federal-
ism, however, these constitutionally ordained doctrines should be
praised, not buried. Many of the features of these doctrines that
have been so criticized were not merely foreseen by the Founders,
they were intended. The framers meant these doctrines, and hence
the American government, to work in the nature that they have."6
What the framers feared was a government that would work too
effectively, so that changes in law would be easy and swift.
convention threatened secession if the federal government used force to enforce the
measures.
10. Federal troops were used to desegregate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkan-
sas, in 1957, the University of Mississippi in 1962, and the University of Alabama in 1963.
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 106 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
14. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Mis-
guided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1985).
15. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985).
16. For a discussion of the framers' intention to build efficiency into the system, see
Fisher, The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STun. 113 (1971).
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To understand these doctrines, it must be understood that al-
though the Constitution is the "wonderful work" that Gladstone
proclaimed it to be, it is misleading to think of it as being "struck
off at a given time" by the mind of man.17 This brilliantly formu-
lated document was the product of history, not visionary dreams.18
The Founders were aware that governments collapsed as well as
rose. Gibbon's classic, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
was published in 1776-the year it all began. Across the ocean, a
government based on the goodness of man was degenerating into a
Reign of Terror. "Experience must be our only guide. Reason may
mislead us," warned John Dickinson at the Constitutional
Convention.l e
World history as wellas the failings of the states under the Arti-
cles of Confederation gave the framers no unrealistic expectations
about the goodness of man. "We have, probably, had too good an
opinion of human nature in forming our confederation," noted
George Washington in 1786.20 "If men were angels, no government
would be necessary," explained Madison.21
The Founders were not antidemocratic. They were realistic and
aware of man's cruder nature, and therefore could not trust direct
democracy. Consequently, they filtered the peoples' potentially de-
structive passions through elected officials. Knowing that liberty
also could be threatened by the officials the people elected, the
Founders distrusted elites as well. History shows that those in
power often grow too bold and overreach, and that power often
becomes concentrated in a single class or group. Therefore, the
framers opposed a system in which all authority could become con-
centrated in a single branch. "The accumulation of all powers leg-
17. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 185 (1878) (describing the Constitution
as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man").
18. For a discussion of the framers' use of history to develop and defend the Constitution,
see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 18 and 19 (A. Hamilton).
19. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 4
(1985).
20. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 472 (1969) (empha-
sis in original).
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 961).
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islative, executive and judiciary in the same hands may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny," Madison declared.22
The framers understood the oppressive nature of governments,
even those operating under written guarantees of rights. They had
just fought a revolution because King George had usurped power
and abused individual liberties. To insure that the government
they were creating would not end up oppressing the people it was
to serve, the framers placed ultimate power in the electorate. They
were unwilling, however, to trust the judgment of the people alone.
After acknowledging that governments were needed because men
were not angels, Madison proceeddd to explain: "You must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself.... [E]xperience has taught man-
kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."23
Thus, they designed a system to block the overreach-a system
of government that would safeguard liberty by avoiding the en-
trapments of tyranny. The framers dispersed constitutional au-
thority among the three branches of government and between the
national and state governments. To further control power, they
made the different national and state officials answerable to differ-
ent constituencies.
After splitting constitutional authority into pieces, they balanced
the pieces against each other. "Ambition must be made to counter-
act ambition," wrote Madison.2 Thus, the Founders designed a
system in which those passions would check each other, rather
than a system that would collapse under uncontrolled ambitions.
Legislative power is balanced by an executive veto. The executive
power of appointment is balanced by the congressional obligation
to advise and consent. The judiciary checks both the legislative
and the executive branch with its ability to nullify acts of either
branch. These "precautions" serve to block the adoption or contin-
uation of unwise policy. Today, there is talk of the presidency and
the Supreme Court having become "imperialistic." The fact is that
throughout American history, each branch of government has
alarmed different sections of the people. Some Founders most
22. TiE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 961).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 21, at 349.
24. Id.
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feared legislative despotism.2 5 In the 1930s, liberals wanted more
power in the executive branch; today, they are concerned with an
"imperial presidency."26 In the early 1930s, the Supreme Court was
the conservatives' best friend; in the 1950s, they came to oppose
the Court's authority. The truth is that no branch of government
isimperialistic. Thanks to the framers' foresight, no branch can
override any other.
Although this is a system of separated institutions checking each
other, it is also one of "separated institutions sharing powers. '2 7
These shares of power were not distributed casually; they were
"carefully related to the capacities of each branch, to its constitu-
ency, and to its intended role in the system."2 The size and com-
mittee structure of Congress assure that the people have an insti-
tutional voice in the daily functioning of the national government.
The presidency places national leadership in a single individual,
and this insures that government can heed the dictates of that
voice more aggressively and efficiently. The bicameral and commit-
tee structures of Congress insure that legislation will be derived
openly and that involved interests will be consulted. The executive
branch gives the government the ability to act energetically, di-
rectly, and, if need be, unilaterally.
By balancing one branch against another, the framers slowed the
operation of government. They frustrated the machinery of gov-
ernment so that foolish or sinister schemes would be exposed and
defeated, so that innovation or departure would be difficult with-
out deep and broad consensus, so that the accumulation of power
in a single branch or by a single interest would be difficult, if not
impossible, and so that the goals of those in government would be
modest. Two branches of government must cooperate before laws
destructive of liberty can be enacted, and two branches of govern-
ment must cooperate in the enforcement of the law.
25. Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judi-
cial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 449, 460 (1958).
26. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
27. R NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960) (emphasis in original).
28. Robinson, The Renewal of American Constitutionalism, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS-DoEs IT STILL WORK? 41 (1986).
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The "Madisonian clockwork," as Laurence Tribe describes it,2"
guarantees friction in the workings of the government. Indeed, the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches has
been so combative that it has been characterized as "guerrilla war-
fare." 30 This warfare has involved the judiciary as well as the exec-
utive and legislative branches. Presidents and congressmen have
assailed the judiciary. "[W]e must take action to save the Consti-
tution from the Court and the Court from itself," declared Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt. 1 In reference to Consumer Energy Coun-
cil of America v. FERC, 2 Senator Schmitt lashed out that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
"an idealized conception of the separation of powers that is neither
historically accurate nor has, until now, been actually applied to
overturn an act of Congress." 3 On the other hand, Judge Mikva of
the D.C. Circuit has attacked Congress for "pass[ing] over the con-
stitutional questions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts. Such
behavior by Congress," he writes, "is... an abnegation of its duty
of responsible lawmaking. ' '1 4
These conflicts between the branches of government and the na-
tional and state governments, however, should be viewed as posi-
tive, not negative. The cooperation in government theoretically de-
sired by so many does not, in reality, constitute the makings of
safe government. One scholar has explained:
The notion that check and balance should involve thwarting,
hampering, interfering, criticizing, opposing, will naturally seem
to many a little perverse and wrong-headed. But the whole point
is that it is the making of mistakes which may thus be ham-
pered, the commission of errors thwarted, the imposition of one-
29. L. TRIE, AMERiCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 15 (1978).
30. A. SCHLESINGER, JR. & A. GRAzIA, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN MOD-
ERN TIMES 4 (1967).
31. 1937 F. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
126 (1941).
32. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional,
as violative of the separation of powers doctrine, a provision in the National Gas Policy Act
of 1978 providing for a one-house veto of "incremental pricing" program ruling by Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission).
33. 128 CONG. REC. 5089 (1982).
34. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 587, 609-10 (1983).
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sided and unfair decisions interfered with, the adoption of
wrong policy opposed. 5
In other words, the friction between the branches is conducive,
not destructive, to good government. Justice Brandeis wrote, "The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise
of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but...
to save the people from autocracy."3 " Thirty years later, in Bow-
sher v. Synar,37 Chief Justice Burger noted that the division of
powers "produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times...
but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and
open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide
avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of government
power. '38
The Supreme Court's shift in approving New Deal legislation
demonstrates Chief Justice Burger's point. Although this reversal
is commonly viewed as the Court's succumbing to political pres-
sure, it was a more complex, constructive affair that involved "full,
vigorous, and open debate" on a great issue, and the nation
benefitted. The change involved an intellectual as well as a politi-
cal challenge to the high court's interpretation of the commerce
clause. No less a constitutional scholar than Corwin warned that
the country faced a "constitutional crisis of unpredictable gravity..
• . [T]he Court . . . will have to enlarge its conception of public
power to include economic power."30
The New Dealers delivered their own intellectual assault. In the
Harvard Law Review, Justice Department Solicitor General Robert
L. Stern challenged the Court's basis for its interpretation of the
commerce clause.40 Going back to the framers for guidance, he ar-
gued that in the commerce clause the Founders had provided the
35. Dexter, Checks and Balances Today, in CONGRESS, THE FIRST BRANCH OF GOVERN-
mENT 83 (1967).
36. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
38. Id. at 3187.
39. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1071,
1084-85 (1936) (emphasis in original).
40. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335 (1934).
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national government with the power it needed to resolve the
problems of trade that the states could not solve on their own.41
Therefore, the New Deal was consistent with the constitutional or-
der established in 1787.42 In speeches and government briefs, New
Dealers cited Stern's argument as they challenged the Court for a
broader interpretation of the commerce clause.43
Although the "switch in time that saved nine" did come, it was a
positive, not a negative one. The switch involved a constitutional
confrontation of the first order that brought forth the best creative
instincts of the administration and the best judgment of the high
court.
The New Dealers' confrontation with the Court also illustrated
the farmers' wisdom in staggering the time periods for which the
members of each branch hold office: the president for four years,
senators for six years, representatives for two years, Supreme
Court Justices for life. Franklin D. Roosevelt accumulated more
power and held it for a longer time than any other person in Amer-
ican history. In 1932 and 1936, he was overwhelmingly elected and
reelected president, and his political party gained significant ma-
jorities in both Houses of Congress. Roosevelt and his party con-
trolled two branches of government, but the third branch, the Su-
preme Court, composed of appointees of previous administrations,
provided a check on swift, sweeping legislation. By the time the
Court had converted to the New Deal line of thinking, another
congressional election had taken place and Roosevelt's opponents
in Congress had rallied, thus preventing the New Deal juggernaut
from running out of control.
The "Madisonian clockwork" allowed New Deal reforms, but
curbed the potential for legislation that may well have transformed
American government and society. The system permitted
Roosevelt to implement New Deal legislation, but it blocked him
when he tried to pack the Court.
Separation of powers has not always been successful in stopping
abuse of power and protecting individual liberty. The system, for
example, enabled Senator Joe McCarthy to trample on the execu-
41. Id. at 1340.
42. Id. at 1362-66.
43. J. ROHR, supra note 3, at 117-20.
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tive branch as well as on the rights of individual Americans. For
the most part, however, the system has controlled abuse. In Kil-
bourn v. Thompson,44 the Court restricted congressional investiga-
tory abilities by limiting its power to delve into the lives of private
individuals, and in Watkins v. United States45 it held that Con-
gress may not "expose the affairs of private individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. '46 In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,47 the Court stopped the
executive branch from usurping legislative authority, and in Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,5 the Court pre-
vented Congress from usurping executive authority.
During the most serious constitutional crisis of recent decades,
even countries with democratic heritages, such as those of Western
Europe, could not understand American concerns with the Nixon
Administration's transgressions of power. But Americans were
alarmed, and the checks and balances locomotive went into high
gear. Congress investigated the activities, the courts interpreted
the law, and the press, protected by the first amendment, reported
the developments that resulted in the downfall of an
administration.
Despite the warfare, the genius of the American separation of
powers is that it does, in fact, allow cooperation among the
branches of government. The different branches work together far
more than is commonly assumed. Stephen Stathis amply docu-
ments the cooperation between the President, Congress, and the
Court in investigatory matters. "One of the most significant char-
acteristics of our constitutional system," he writes, "is that genu-
44. 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (Congress may not punish a witness for contempt in an inquiry
into the private affairs of a citizen).
45. 354 U.S. 178, 199 (1957) (Congress may not convict a witness for refusing to answer a
question "pertinent to the question under inquiry" when the "question under inquiry" is
unclear).
46. Id. at 187.
47. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (an Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate steel mills is unconstitutional, although issued to avert a strike that could have
jeopardized national defense).
48. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional, as violative of the presentment clauses,
a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizing either house of Congress to
invalidate a decision of the Attorney General to allow a particular deportable alien to re-
main in the United States).
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inely workable decisions are often reached only after inquiry, con-
sultation, and compromise.14 9 In the realm of foreign policy, Peter
Schultz points out that "congressional and presidential power sup-
plement and complement each other in a way too little appreci-
ated."'50 Much of the "history of the separation-of-powers doctrine
is also a history of accommodation," wrote Justice White in his
dissent in Chadha.5 1
Federalism, like separation of powers, plays a valuable role in
the workings of the American government and the protection of
liberty. Although the decision in Garcia prompted one scholar to
announce its "second death,"52 the fact is that federalism has had
a number of obituaries.5 3 But as Mark Twain remarked, rumors of
deaths can be exaggerated.5 4 President Carter's anti-Washington
theme and President Reagan and the "Sagebrush Rebellion" have
shown that federalism, although perhaps momentarily comatose as
a constitutional issue, is alive and well as a political one.
In the 1840s, Alexis de Tocqueville lauded federalism for reasons
that are taken for granted today, but which weighed heavily on
world history. He explained that small nations have "always been
the cradle of political liberty,"5 5 and that liberty is lost as they
grow in size, strength, and wealth. He wrote, "The history of the
world affords no instance of a great nation retaining the form of
republican government.... All the passions that are most fatal to
republican institutions increase with an increasing territory... .,,51
But, under the "most perfect federal constitution that ever ex-
isted, 57 as he called it, the United States had found a way to grow
in size and power without succumbing to the deadly passions be-
cause federalism preserved the virtues of the smaller state. Conse-
49. Stathis, Executive Cooperation, 3 Law & Pol. 187, 292 (1986).
50. Schultz, Separation of Powers and Foreign Affairs, in SEPARATION OF PowERs_-DOES
IT STML WORK?, supra note 28, at 121.
51. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
52. Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 1709.
53. For previous announcements of the death of federalism, see L. TmE, supra note 29,
at 17 n.9.
54. Cable from Mark Twain in London to the Associated Press (1897).
55. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVJLLE, DEmocRAcY IN AMERICA 160 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
56. Id. at 160-61 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 166.
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quently, "[t]he Union is happy and free as a small people, and glo-
rious and strong as a great nation.""8
So much of what the French observer wrote still holds true to-
day, for reasons he cited, and others. Like separation of powers,
federalism obliges government to control itself. Under federalism,
local majorities curb the power of national majorities, thus making
seizure of power by a national majority difficult. States, John
Roche explains, "provide political obstacles to centralization that
are far more effective than their constitutional position might
indicate. '59
Federalism provides an effective framework for harmonizing ma-
jority power and minority rights.6 0 "The genius of this double sys-
tem," according to James Burns, is "its ability to morselize sec-
tional and economic and other conflicts before they bec[o]me
flammable .... [It] keep[s] the great mobiles of ideological, re-
gional, and other political energies in balance" until accommoda-
tion is achieved.6 1 Therefore, the essence of federalism has been
balances and compromises, and this is vintage American politics.
The system did collapse in the 1850s and 1860s, but over moral,
not political or constitutional issues. Federalism constitutes what
Justice Brennan has termed a "double source of protection"6 2 for
the rights of American citizens. Each lev'el of government must
heed the injunction that no person may be deprived of life, liberty
or property "without due process of law,"6 he points out. This
"double protection" was revealed with the increased activism of
state courts in the 1960s. Early in the decade, according to Justice
Brennan, the Supreme Court enhanced individual rights and liber-
ties as the Warren Court imposed tougher standards on states in
criminal procedures, reapportionment, and civil liberties.6 4 But as
the high court began to "pull back from.., the enforcement of the
58. Id. at 165.
59. J. Roche, Constitutional Law: Distribution of Powers, in 3 INT'L ENCYC. Soc. SCL 300,
304 (1968).
60. Id. at 302.
61. J. BURNs, THE VINEYARD OF LMERTY 598 (1981).
62. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 498, 503 (1977).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64. Brennan, supra note 62, at 495.
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Boyd principle," state courts began extending the protections pro-
vided in their own state constitutions.6 5
Because the national government has constantly intruded into
the internal affairs of states, federalism cannot be considered an
equal partnership. For the most part, however, the institutions
have been in the interest of enhancing liberty. "Historically, most
limitations on personal liberties have come from the states," and
the national government has constantly striven to eliminate these
denials.6 Brown v. Board of Education and Baker v. Carr68 are
well-known examples of how the national government, via the Su-
preme Court, has guaranteed constitutional rights for minorities.
The national government also has exercised its authority to abolish
child labor and sweatshops, and to strengthen the freedoms of the
first and fourteenth amendments.
By virtue of their own sovereign power, the states still control
many of the choices that immediately and directly affect the lives
of its citizens. They control municipal and local governments, char-
ter corporations, administer civil and criminal law, and direct the
education, health, safety, and welfare of the people.
With this emphasis on local rule, federalism encourages political
experimentation. States serve as "laboratories" of democracy 9 be-
cause reforms can be attempted locally before becoming national
policy, thereby reducing the cost of political reform. Failures are
confined to local impact. Successes, such as expansion of voting
rights and labor law and regulatory reforms, become national pol-
icy. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may... try novel social and economic ex-
periments without risk to the rest of the country," Justice Bran-
deis explained in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.70
65. Id. at 494. The principle of Boyd v. United States discussed by Justice Brennan is
that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed.... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
66. 2 S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 517 (6th ed. 1969).
67. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
69. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
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This emphasis on local rule gives different interests stronger
voices in how their lives are governed than would be possible
strictly at the national level. Furthermore, it allows for local policy
in areas where uniform national policy would be disastrous, if not
tyrannical. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation," wrote Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,71 "it is that no official . . . can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion .... ,,7' As long as federalism is alive and
well-which it is-there will be no national orthodoxy.
The keystone of the constitutional process is the judiciary. The
Supreme Court's role was deemed so important that the Founders
gave the Justices life tenure, thus insuring the high court's inde-
pendence, although it has no separate constituency. The Court in-
sures that the Constitution, and hence the doctrines of separated
powers and federalism, are properly construed.
The Court provides a valuable check on government by giving
citizens power over the laws that govern them. Since Marbury v.
Madison,7 when the Court became the final interpreters of the
Constitution, an individual citizen has the power, through a law-
suit, to check a law passed by Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent. Before becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Robert Jackson
noted: "[L]awsuits are the chief instrument of power in our sys-
tem. Struggles over power that in Europe call out regiments of
troops, in America call out battalions of lawyers.17 4
This instrument of power has enhanced liberty for all Ameri-
cans. From the 1940s to the 1960s, black Americans found the
courts to be the one branch of government willing to force America
to live up to its promises to all of its citizens. Likewise, unsuccess-
ful with the other government branches, environmental, consumer,
and labor groups have turned to the courts for relief.
In the United States, the three branches of government, with the
Supreme Court leading the way, have shown that individual liberty
and economic security need not be incompatible. Although much
71. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
72. Id.
73. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
74. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xi (1941).
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attention has been given to the Court's role in economic matters
during the Roosevelt era, less attention has been paid to its role in
preserving individual liberties, and this is unfortunate. During that
turbulent decade, the American government met the economic cri-
sis without tossing aside the Constitution and the liberties it guar-
antees. The Court, during Roosevelt's presidency, strengthened the
dicta of Gitlow v. New York, which extended the Bill of Rights to
the states.7 5 In DeJonge v. Oregon 6 it expanded the right of as-
sembly; in Herndon v. Lowry7 7 and Thornhill v. Alabama78 it en-
hanced free speech; in Chambers v. Florida"9 it helped guarantee
fair trials to black Americans; in Grosjean v. American Press Co.80
it broadened the guarantee of the free press. "[T]he Constitution is
what the judges say it is," Chief Justice Hughes explained in his
immortal phrase, "and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty
... under the Constitution.
81
The emphasis on individual rights displayed by the Court during
the Roosevelt years has been typical of the American government
since 1787. The people, said Jefferson, "are the only sure reliance
for the preservation of our liberty."8 "A dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government," wrote
Madison." This characteristic has separated the United States
from much of the world. During periods of social convulsions or
political turmoil, when so many other countries move in the direc-
tion of restricting democracy (for example, banning elections and
closing presses), the United States has moved in the direction of
expanding democracy. To Americans, the ills of democracy are best
cured by more democracy, not less. This is what the Founders in-
tended, for the Constitution begins: "We the People... in Order
75. 268 U.S. 642, 666 (1925) (assuming that freedom of speech and press are among the
rights protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
76. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
77. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
78. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
79. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
80. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
81. R. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 3 (quoting ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EvANS
HUGHES 185-86 (2d ed. 1916)) (emphasis omitted).
82. T. JEFFERSON, Letter to John Adams, in 6 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392
(1904).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 21, at 355.
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to form a more perfect Union ... The people, not institutions
or states, are sovereign.
In this sense, Baker v. Carr8 5 is the Warren Court's decision of
greatest consequence for all Americans. 8 6 Based on the equal pro-
tection clause, this landmark case further insured that each Ameri-
can is armed with the means to make his or her view felt. Chief
Justice Warren was typical of the Supreme Court, which in recent
decades has abolished "white primaries, ''1 7 racial gerrymandering,"
and poll taxes8 as conditions for political participation. The Court
has been typical of the United States, in general. Through consti-
tutional amendments, suffrage has been extended to include those
without property, blacks, women, and eighteen year olds. By the
1950s and 1960s, Congress was on board with the passage of legis-
lation strengthening statutes protecting the right to vote. By 1965,
the executive branch was fully on board as President Johnson ap-
pealed for federal action to guarantee every American the right to
vote and hold office.
Despite their distrust of popular democracy, the framers never
questioned that government should be accountable to the people,
for the people constitute the most important "precaution" against
the abuse of power. The people select who will govern and throw
out of office those who betray that trust. Through elections, the
people evaluate and check the so-called power elite, and provide
the greatest protection of their own liberties.
We the people, through separation of powers and federalism,
have prevailed. The doctrines have their faults, but they have suc-
cessfully performed their most valuable tasks. Recent events have
again demonstrated the framers' sagacity in recognizing that "men
are not angels" and constructing a framework of government satu-
rated with "precautions." For 200 years, the doctrines have been
84. U.S. CONST. preamble.
85. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
86. Brennan, supra note 62, at 493.
87. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (resolution by a political party excluding
blacks from voting in the primary election violated the fifteenth amendment).
88. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (change in boundary lines of a city that
had a discriminatory effect on black voters violated the fifteenth amendment).
89. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
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instrumental components of a Constitution that has allowed Amer-
icans to enjoy "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"90 by pro-
viding a safe, stable government that not only guards against tyr-
anny but promotes liberty.
The American ship of state has sailed through some mighty
rough storms and it undoubtedly will have to weather many more.
But it has a solid structure, thanks to the Constitution writers of
1787. The crew may get out of hand at times, but the sturdy vessel
keeps them out of the water.
Candace H. Beckett
90. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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